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Abstract 
In a (2016) paper in this journal, I defuse allegations that theoretical ecological research is 
problematic because it relies on teleological metaphysical assumptions.  Mark Sagoff offers a formal 
reply.  In it, he concedes that I succeeded in establishing that ecologists abandoned robust 
teleological views long ago and that they use teleological characterizations as metaphors that aid in 
developing mechanistic explanations of ecological phenomena.  Yet, he contends that I did not give 
enduring criticisms of theoretical ecology a fair shake in my paper.  He says this is because enduring 
criticisms center on concerns about the nature of ecological networks and forces, the instrumentality 
of ecological laws and theoretical models, and the relation between theoretical and empirical 
methods in ecology that that paper does not broach.  Below I set apart the distinct criticisms Sagoff 
presents in his commentary and respond to each in turn. 
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Mark Sagoff  pursues a practically-motivated approach to environmental philosophy that I greatly 
appreciate.  In several works, he critically analyzes the foundations of  theoretical methods in 
ecology, and questions whether they can be usefully applied for public policy and resource 
management decision-making (Sagoff  1997; 2000; 2003; 2013; 2016).  Such analysis is crucially 
important because leading environmental advisory organizations have cast ecology as an objective 
guide for significant policy and management decisions.1 
In some recent papers, I examine how different inferential methods in theoretical ecology 
work and how they can (and cannot) be usefully applied for practical decision-making.  In my (2016), 
“Theoretical Ecology as Etiological from the Start,” I dispel claims that theoretical ecological 
                                                            
1 See Donhauser 2016a and Donhauser 2016b and the sources cited therein for more discussion of ways in which 
ecology has been bestowed this guiding role. 
research is unscientific and of  no value for practical decision-making because it is supposed to rely 
on teleological thinking.  Therein, I spotlight comments made by Sagoff  (2013) as expressions of  
the criticisms I had in mind. 
I was pleased to see Sagoff ’s formal response, and sincerely appreciate his endorsement of  
my positive arguments in my recent paper.  In a kind fashion, he says: “Donhauser admirably 
succeeds in showing that several founders of  ecological theory, including Lindeman (1942) and 
Hutchinson (1948), had ‘efficient’ rather than ‘final’ causality in mind.” So, although he lodges 
complaints later on, Sagoff  confirms that I succeed in showing that ecologists abandoned robust 
teleological views long ago, and use teleological characterizations of  ecological phenomena as 
metaphors that aid in developing mechanistic accounts of  the underlying causes of  observable 
ecological “network-level” dynamics.  He also takes no issue with my operational account of  the role 
of  teleological metaphors in certain reasoning processes commonly employed in ecology after 
Hutchinson (1948) (pp. 71-2).  Moreover, Sagoff  does nothing to undermine my contention that 
modern ecologists generally embrace a thoroughgoing instrumentalist and metaphysic-neutral view 
on the nature of  ecological networks and properties (pp. 68-9; 74).  In fact, most of  his reply 
concerns not what I argue in my paper but what it left him wanting me to say about the nature of  
ecological networks, so-called ecological “forces,” and theoretical models of  such things. 
Sagoff ’s negative appraisal is that I have been uncharitable in my treatment of  criticisms of  
theoretical ecology.  According to him, this is because enduring criticisms center on interrelated 
concerns about the existential status of  ecological networks and forces, the instrumentality of  
ecological laws and models derived therefrom, and the relation between theoretical and empirical 
methods in ecology that not discussed in that paper.  Yet, despite his initial comments about the 
ways I succeed in the paper, Sagoff ’s interpretation and critique of  my paper show that he and I see 
theoretical ecology and its criticisms very differently. 
Sagoff  gerrymanders the scope of  my brief  and narrowly focused comments about 
criticisms of  ecology, and claims that I should have addressed several issues my paper was never 
meant to address.  Though he frames it as a response to my claim that methods in modern 
theoretical ecology have always been underwritten by an etiological, rather than a teleological, 
understanding of  ecological networks, he uses his commentary primarily as a vehicle for endorsing 
several independent criticisms of  theoretical ecology that he runs together and that are outside the 
explicit scope of  my paper.  Unfortunately, the criticisms Sagoff  defends in his reply, and his 
comparatively few criticisms of  claims I make in my paper, are founded on mistaken assumptions 
about the conceptual foundations and basic workings of  theoretical methods in ecology.  
Accordingly, I see this opportunity to respond Sagoff  as an opportunity to push forward 
understanding of  ecology’s conceptual foundations and practical value. 
My rejoinder to Sagoff  will progress in two main steps. First, in §1, I assess Sagoff ’s critique 
of  my paper, and identify problems with its set up, scope, and framing that largely belie his 
commentary. In §2, I then systematically defuse several independent criticisms Sagoff  endorses in 
his commentary. 
§1. Problems with Sagoff Criticism of Donhauser (2016) 
1.1. A Bait-and-switch 
Sagoff  defends criticisms of  theoretical ecology he says I unfairly brush aside via presenting what he 
frames as counterpoints to my contention that ‘theoretical ecology has been etiological from the 
start.’  In my (2016), I show that in “the first, and […] archetypical, project in modern theoretical 
ecology” and key works directly preceding it, seminal ecologists explicitly abandoned robust 
teleological commitments and use “teleological metaphors to aid in generating component-to-
component accounts of  the mechanics of  ecological network-level dynamics” (p. 73).  In response, 
Sagoff  claims that theoretical ecology has never been etiological.  However, he does not then establish 
this or even deny my point.  He instead uses ‘etiological’ in a way inconsistent with my carefully 
restricted usage, and uses the slogan that ‘ecology has never been etiological’ to loosely pull together 
several independent criticisms that are tangential to the considerations of  my paper. 
 This begins happening as he specifies that by saying ‘theoretical ecology has never been 
etiological’ he means: “[ecologists have] not presented empirical evidence of  the causal forces it 
theorizes, such as density dependence, competitive exclusion, Lotka-Volterra predator-prey relations, 
the logistic relation of  species abundance to resource limits, and the like” (p. 2).  Sagoff  brings in 
further tangential concerns later, but even here, at his commentary’s start, he has conceded my main 
point and shifted to discussing concerns about “ecological forces” and the relation between 
theoretical and empirical work in ecology that are outside the scope my paper.  After this brief  
clarification on the first page, Sagoff  (literally) does not mention etiology, teleology, or the 
distinction between “top-down” and “bottom-up” thinking anywhere else in his commentary.  He 
instead launches into a discussion of  old criticisms of  theoretical ecology that see it as divorced 
from empirical work, which he ties to independent concerns about ecological forces, regularities, and 
the existential status of  ecological entities. 
He buttresses his worry about an alleged disconnect between theoretical and empirical 
ecology by citing Hall (1988), who once complained that ecological principles and models are often 
taught, and presented in textbooks, as if  they are “a priori true” even though they have known 
exceptions (p. 2; cf. Haskell 1940).  Sagoff  attaches this arguably anachronistic brand of  critique 
lodged by Hall to the abovementioned independent issues by then pointing to an oft-cited paper by 
Lawton (1999); who argues that there are no ecological community-level regularities in nature 
because contingent local factors are so various and diverse that such regularities just do not occur.  
Sagoff  then abruptly brings in worries about the nature of  ecological networks, properties, and 
kinds, saying: “many of  the kinds of  [network-level] properties theoreticians posit and 
mathematicians model are observable in principle; the critics contend, however, that these patterns 
or regularities are not observed in fact” (p. 1).  He relates this loosely associated bundle of  
independent concerns back to my paper in an ad hoc fashion; by concluding that my recent 
demonstration that ‘modern ecologists do not rely on assumptions about teleological causes of  
ecological network-level properties’ is inconsequential to enduring criticisms of  theoretical ecology.   
According to him, this is because undermining enduring criticisms requires defusing the 
aforementioned concerns by establishing that ecological network-level properties, the “forces” that 
produce them, and regularities and laws applying to them are observed in nature. 
1.2. Misjudging the Scope 
My (2016) paper’s main point is that ecologists’ use of  teleological language is metaphorical and a 
conceptual device for helping to fill out the “bottom-up,” efficient, causal picture they presuppose.  
Yet, Sagoff ’s commentary focuses on topics orthogonal to the questions of  whether ecologists 
accept a robust teleology and “top-down” causes—while he also explicitly agrees that they do not.  What’s 
more, he unfairly flags my comments about criticisms of  theoretical ecology as uncharitable and 
inconsequential. 
Sagoff  mistakenly believes that I respond to a much broader class of  criticisms of  ecology 
than I do in my paper.  He remarks that my paper’s introduction, “helpfully and accurately cit[es] a 
list of  authors who have questioned whether the entities described in ecological theory exist in any 
meaningful sense at all” and others who “have argued that theoretical ecological research is 
empirically unfounded (even empirically unfoundable)” (p. 68).  Yet, I cite those criticisms early on 
to emphasize the juxtaposition between the unfettered embrace of  ecology in policy circles and the 
wariness of  it expressed by some academics.  I do not purport to respond to the whole class of  
enduring criticisms, and my project is not even presented as a response to criticisms.  It is presented 
as a historical project that provides insights into the heuristic roles of  teleological metaphors in 
certain sorts of  theoretical research, and which has ramifications for certain misinterpretations of  
work in modern ecology.  The explicit aim is not ‘defusing criticisms of  ecology’ but ‘providing 
insights into the workings of  certain inferential processes in ecology’ through examination of  key 
moments in theoretical ecology’s genesis.  I do say that my arguments have ramifications for some 
criticisms, but those comments are restricted to criticisms that concern teleological language used in 
ecology. 
 As I say at the top of  my paper, in the final section, “I critically respond to opposing literalist 
construals of  teleological characterizations in ecology—including enduring arguments according to 
which theoretical ecological research is unscientific and of  no value for practical decision-making 
because it is supposed to rely on teleological, ‘magical,’ thinking” (p. 68).  I accomplish this by 
providing textual and conceptual support for my prior contention that robust teleological views are 
not and have not been embraced as a mainstream convention within ecology since Hutchison (1948) 
at least.  Nowhere do I say that my arguments in the paper have ramifications for criticisms of  
ecology centering on concerns other than ecologists’ ostensible appeals to teleological causes.  So, 
since Sagoff  agrees that I succeed in establishing that modern ecologists do not embrace robust 
teleological views, he must concede that criticisms that assume as much are indeed without basis.  
But, rather than conceding this, Sagoff  speciously denies the force of  my brief  and pointed 
comments about such criticisms. 
1.3. Sagoff ’s Misleading Appraisal 
Sagoff  denies that my arguments have ramifications for criticisms of  theoretical ecology by implying 
that no critics actually employ a literalist reading of  teleological language used by ecologists.  As he 
puts it, in his abstract, “Donhauser strenuously denies that theoretical ecology must have teleological 
foundations, but those critical of  it do not assume it does. They argue instead that it lacks empirical 
support” (p. 1).  I was flummoxed when I read these words, because Sagoff  has argued that 
theoretical ecology is problematic because it relies on robust teleological assumptions.  Indeed, in 
writing my paper, I took his more recent comments that theoretical ecology relies on “magical 
thinking” (2013) as a nod back to such arguments in earlier work. 
Though they appear in other works as well, he presents the relevant arguments most 
forcefully in a 1997 paper where he says: 
“[T]he temptation to ascribe a purpose, order, or design to nature remains strong in spite of  
all the Darwinian objections against doing so[…] Ecologists themselves are loathe to let go 
of  the notion that Nature has a nature[...] As ecologists throw teleology out the front door, 
they smuggle it in by the back.” (1997, p. 830) 
 
Sagoff  carries on later in that piece, claiming that “theoretical ecology blurs the distinction between 
science and religion” and that “[b]y dressing traditional conceptions of  Creation in mathematical 
concepts and models, the mainstream position in theoretical ecology maintains its deeply satisfying 
image of  nature’s orderliness and purposiveness” (1997, p. 888). 
Of  course, I may have mistakenly thought Sagoff ’s more recent comments pointed back to 
these explicit critical arguments that pin teleology on modern ecologists.  But surely my claim that 
some critics have lodged such arguments is justified nonetheless; and my brief  comment that my 
arguments showing that literalist interpretations of  teleological language fail also show that any such 
criticisms fail still stands.  If  Sagoff  means what he says when he confirms that I succeed in defusing 
literalist interpretations, he must admit that my recent paper suffices to show that his earlier 
criticisms in this vein and others like them are hyperbole.  Yet, after denying me this without 
argument, he concentrates exclusively on concerns tangential to those addressed in my paper.  Since 
I am grateful for any opportunity to clear up enduring confusions about ecology and its practical 
applicability, I will now systematically disentangle and defuse the broader independent concerns 
Sagoff  wants to discuss. 
§2.  Disentangling and Defusing Tangential Concerns 
Sagoff  begins actively defending several independent criticisms of  theoretical ecology by discussing 
“ecological forces” he claims play key roles in reasoning processes commonly employed in 
theoretical ecology.2  He has in mind general forces, which he indicates by distinguishing between 
“greater causes” that are operative “across environments” and “lesser causes” that are “place-
specific” and accidental.3  Sagoff  invokes J.S. Mill’s discussion of  Tidology to motivate a, decidedly 
superannuated, positivist stance; according to which genuine sciences must produce theoretical 
principles from which one can infer by deduction what will occur in particular situations in nature.4 
 He points to the Tidology meta-model as an exemplary sort of  model based on theoretical 
principles that take account of  general forces that he suggests theoretical ecological models (TEMs) 
try to emulate.  Tidology basically explains that regular tidal patterns result from the relative 
positions of  the Earth and Moon and their gravitational effects on each other. According to Sagoff, 
this “model” is accurately predictive and informative because: “[t]he gravitational forces on which 
the levels of  the tides depend are strong, general, and wide-ranging enough that they can be 
distinguished in their efficiency from the incidental factors that vary place to place” (p. 2).  By 
contrast, he says TEMs cannot be informative because: “unlike Tidology, ecology cannot distinguish 
between greater and lesser causes […]  The abundance and distribution of  plants and animals […] 
result from local, idiosyncratic, incidental, and circumstantial forces and conditions particular to a 
place and time” (ibid.). 
 In view of  this, Sagoff  then endorses what some call the “contingency hypothesis,” 
according to which individual ecological networks are sensitive to so many contingent factors that 
                                                            
2 Sagoff ’s overall presentation faces a more global issue that I will ignore in the interest of  seriously engaging his 
arguments.  In brief, this is that he speaks of  theoretical methods and modeling as if  there is a singular, “theoretical,” 
approach when in fact there is a diversity of  approaches and methods and many combinations of  them. 
3 His use of  this distinction is confusing and brings in other independent issues, as there can be accidental local causes 
that are dominant, or “greater,” in bringing about an effect (e.g. an aggressive invasive species could extinct a population 
of  a certain tree species in one place and not others).  The distinction also risks conflating  ‘greatness’ (magnitude) and 
‘generalness’ (universality). 
4 Sagoff purports to echo Lange (2005).  However, Lange invokes Mill’s discussion to make a rather different point 
about causality and ecological laws, and he does not endorse the sort of old-school positivism Sagoff espouses. 
each is unique (Sterelny 2001, pp. 158–9).5  He subsequently endorses four distinct claims he 
contends pose a problem for the denial of  broader criticisms of  theoretical ecology that he 
attributes to me.  He endorses two claims, (i) and (ii), that are supposed to follow from the 
contingency hypotheses: 
(i)  “[in ecological research] there is no way to distinguish the signal from the noise” / ‘no 
distinction to be drawn between the “greater causes” and the myriad of  local contingent 
factors’ 
(ii)  “ecology should be directed not toward theorizing [about] patterns and regularities that do 
not exist but toward building a catalogue of  case studies” 
Then he endorses variations of  the abovementioned claims concerning “ecological forces” and the 
nature of  theoretical ecology, that he thinks follow from (i) and (ii).  These are: 
(iii)  TEMs cannot usefully characterize natural target systems because the ecological forces they 
(allegedly) posit are not found in nature 
(iv) reasoning with TEMs cannot usefully inform questions about natural ecological phenomena, 
because such models are (allegedly) derived from empirically-unfounded, “a priori,” 
principles from which actual ecological dynamics cannot be deduced. 
 
Recognizing key problems with (iii) and (iv) reveals mistaken assumptions that belie Sagoff ’s critique 
theoretical ecology while at once providing insights into how theoretical methods square with (i) and 
(ii) via their relationship with empirical methods. 
2.1. What ecological forces?   
Claim (iii) derives from Sagoff ’s belief  that theoretical reasoning and models in ecology work by 
appeal to general forces. Yet, just looking at how commonly employed TEMs work makes it clear that 
they do not.  In fact, the physics models and ecological models that he compares do not work the 
same way at all.  To illustrate this, let’s consider models based on the Lotka-Volterra principles; 
which  Sagoff  lists as an exemplary sort of  TEMs via referring to “Lotka-Volterra relations” as an 
                                                            
5 For discussion of  some practical implications of  the contingency hypothesis, see Donhauser 2016a, 15-8. 
example of  what he considers ‘general ecological forces’ represented in TEMs.6  To flesh out the 
contrast Sagoff  evokes, let’s compare the Lotka-Volterra models (LV-models) with a mathematical 
expression of  models based on a key principle used in Tidology: Newton’s Law of  Universal 
Gravitation, which states that any two massive bodies will exhibit gravitational pull on one another. 
A classic model used to calculate the gravitational force, F, between two bodies, m1 and m2 
(e.g. the Earth and Moon), includes the paradigmatic general force via including the gravitational 
constant, G, as is shown in (1).  
ܨ ൌ ீ	∗	௠భ	∗	௠మௗమ       (1) 
Here a general force plays a role in calculations and predictions via the way the variables factor with 
the constant—G often stands in for 6.673 x 10-11 N m2/kg2.  By contrast, LV-models do not contain 
any general forces. 
LV-models apply general ideas from kinetics to characterize dynamical relationships between 
biological populations interacting as predator and prey.  Variables for species-typical efficiencies, 
relationships, and mortality rates comprise LV-models; their values and mechanisms of  realization 
change depending on which populations one selects to play predator and prey roles in her model 
predator/prey community.   A simplified variation is expressible as a coupled set of  equations: 
ௗ஽
ௗ௧ ൌ ܽܦ െ ܾܦܹ      (2) 
ௗௐ
ௗ௧ ൌ െܹܿ ൅ ݀ܦܹ     (3) 
Here D is the number of  members of  a simulated prey population (e.g., a target deer population), W 
is the number of  members of  a simulated predator population for that prey population (e.g., a target 
wolf  population), t is elapsed time since the beginning of  the simulation period [T], a is the growth 
                                                            
6 Sagoff  also discusses LV-models as exemplary of  models that appeal to “ecological forces” in a recent paper (his 2016). 
rate of  the prey [1/T], b is the parameter that quantifies the effect of  predators on prey mortality,  c 
is the death rate of  the predator [1/T], and d is the parameter that quantifies the effect of  prey 
consumption on the growth of  the predator.7 
Models extrapolated from these basic equations help one estimate changes in a prey 
population’s abundance across time [݀ܦ/݀ݐ] by assuming that this is jointly determined by that 
population’s species-typical growth rate and the efficiency of  a predator population [ܽܦ െ ܾܦܹ]. 
Such models can also help estimate changes in the abundance of  that predator population across 
time [ܹ݀/݀ݐ] by assuming that is jointly determined by species-typical mortality rates and the rate 
at which that population’s abundance increases as a result of  consuming prey (that population’s 
“conversion efficiency”) ሾെܹܿ ൅ ݀ܦܹሿ.8 
LV-models are used to simulate how natural populations may change relative to one another 
by identifying populations that can be seen as interacting as predator and prey and then inputting 
population-specific variable values. Whether members of  any population are effectively a predator 
or prey for those of  another is a simple matter of  whom typically eats (or otherwise hastens the 
mortality of) whom.  For instance, dragonflies are predators for bees and at once potential prey for 
many species of  frogs. With this simple who-eats/kills-who criterion, one can determine on the 
basis of  observation or prior knowledge about species-typical behaviors which natural populations 
are predators and which are prey for an endless array of  species. 
                                                            
7 I have not included units for b and d because they are complicated and their inclusion would complicate my discussion 
of  LV-models unnecessarily; Odenbaugh 2005 provides a more detailed analysis of  LV-models and discusses how 
certain sorts of  calculations are done with them. 
8 Lotka’s (1925, pp. 92-3) original discussion of these equations is exceptionally clear and concise.  Since I am here 
concerned only with providing a cursory idea of how LV-models works, I refer my reader to his discussion for 
explanation of the rationale behind their construction.  
Notably, there are no operative general forces anywhere in the thinking behind LV-models.9  
There are general features one might consider “constants” in LV-models.  Species-typical predation 
and prey relationships, efficiencies, and mortality rates are key features of  LV-models in general.  
These features also correspond to typicalities that are causally relevant to population and 
community-level abundance dynamics.  Some would even call statements about such typicalities 
ecological “laws”—since some laws are generalizations about regularities.  For example, ‘wolves hunt 
and never graze,’ ‘deer graze and never hunt,’ and statements about average species lifespans could 
be counted as ecological laws (see Partridge 2000, p. 86).  Yet, to my knowledge, ecologists have not 
proposed any general force—nothing like gravity—that is supposed to produce population and 
community-level properties. 
In my view, trying to envisage typical predator/prey interactions as general forces in the way 
Sagoff  does is quite odd, because they are typicalities that bear on aggregate dynamics not a 
dominant general force operating across different contexts.  Accordingly, I submit that Sagoff  is 
mistaken in thinking that LV-models and other TEMs see such interactions as general forces; and I 
have not encountered anyone in the literature in ecology including such forces in methods using 
TEMs.  There is also no reason to think ecologists must do so to show that TEMs are useful and 
informative, except to presuppose that reasoning with theoretical models must operate according to 
a very limited, and dated, positivist ideal.  Sagoff ’s view of  theoretical ecology rest on such a 
presupposition. 
2.2. What “A Priori” Assumptions? 
Sagoff  claim (iv) comes out as he says that theoretical ecology “proceeds by deducing the 
consequences of  principles assumed a priori” (p. 12).  He cites as an example the deduction of  
correlated “oscillations” in species abundances from models based on Lotka-Volterra principles.  So, 
                                                            
9 There are many different kinds of scientific principles and laws, and only a limited set deal with forces; cf. Woodward 
2002 and Schurz 2002. 
Sagoff  claims that ecologists have made up principles about general ecological forces, “a priori,” and 
then purport to deduce how natural populations and communities should behave with models based 
on such principles (cf. Sagoff  2000, pp. 70-72).  Yet, even if  we assume that by “a priori” Sagoff  just 
means prior to observations—rather than the stronger sense standard in philosophical discussions—
we can see his comment is off  track in several ways. 
I have already argued that he is mistaken about ecologists making up the general forces he 
says play roles in reasoning with TEMs.  More importantly here though, we have also seen TEMs, 
LV-models, that take account of  species-isomorphic typicalities.  Those are not invented but derived 
from observations of  instances of  predator and prey species.  In fact, LV-equations aren’t even LV-
models, they are not models of  anything, until species-typical values (or “toy” values) are input for 
their variables.10  Reasoning with such models does not assume anything a priori.11  Even the general 
relationships LV-equations characterize were borne out by observations; as Vito Volterra was led to 
develop the core bits of  LV-models only after observing predator/prey relationships, and correlated 
dynamics, in Adriatic fisheries (see Guerraggio & Paoloni 2010, p. 78).   
One might also point out that the ecological models Sagoff  asks us to consider are in a sense 
less removed from empirically observations than the physics models he discusses.  Mechanisms that 
realize what we conceptualize as gravitational forces are famously opaque—imagine Newton with 
his hands in the air (Newton 2004, 92).  By contrast, species-typical behaviors and interactions that 
bear on aggregate abundance dynamics are observable.  For instance, members of  a wolf  pack 
eating deer is an observable mechanism for changes in that prey population’s abundance; each kill 
surely changes their overall abundance by one. 
                                                            
10 LV-models are not really predator/prey models but, more specifically, predator-species/prey-species models—where 
population-isomorphic differences make different LV-models. 
11 There are applications of  other sorts of  TEMs that apply selected principles to dictate what can occur in models, but 
even there empirical knowledge constrains thinking. 
I think what Sagoff  is trying to highlight with his comments about “a prioricity” is that 
ecological principles, like the LV-principles expressed via (2) and (3), are data-neutral; since they are 
not directly extrapolated from any particular data-set but are intended to be applied to predator and 
prey populations generally (cf. Levin 1980, p. 424).  However, that does not count against theoretical 
models or methods.  It is just to say theoretical models are differently related to data, and play 
different roles in reasoning in ecology, than models created by simply aggregating data.  Indeed, 
Sagoff ’s comments (iii-vi) rely on overlooking the complementary roles theoretical and aggregate-
data models play in ecology. 
TEMs basically see two general uses in ecological research: they are used to organize and 
interpolate data to aid in understanding observable phenomena and hypothesis development and 
refinement; and they are used to simulate ecological possibilities to aid in understanding and develop 
and refine hypotheses (both in particular cases and in general).  Moreover, in practice, TEMs are 
often systematically modified with data and augmented with other models that track site-specific 
features to provide new insights into what is going on in particular cases.  Accordingly, I submit that 
TEMs are well characterized as adaptable tools for developing better hypotheses and theories via iterative ampliative 
reasoning processes, as opposed to deductive frameworks derived from accepted theories that are 
applied only by some “a priori” deductive, HD, process (cf. Wimsatt 2007, Ch. 6). 
Even with just an understanding of  the basics of  LV-models, as outlined above, one can see 
that such models have uses beyond just generating simulations that have nothing to do with 
empirical and practical considerations.  For instance, imagine how a natural resource manager might 
devise a simple LV-model to help select species management strategies.  By using such a model to 
organize data and/or simulate ecological possibilities, she could better estimate the likelihood of  
possibilities such as: 
whether a wolf  population could possibly annihilate a deer population (e.g., to inform wolf-
control strategies); 
 
what impacts hunting of  members of  a predator or prey population could have on the 
abundance of  the other population; 
how the introduction new predator or prey populations (e.g., an invasive species or a 
predator reintroduction) could impact population dynamics in a place. 
 
From his (i) and (ii), I anticipate that Sagoff ’s response here is that, even though they may 
countenance empirical considerations and can be used to guide thinking about particular 
populations, such models are still uninformative because a ‘myriad of  local contingent factors’ will 
produce local circumstances that cannot be deduced from them in any case.12   
He is right that simple LV-models are too partial to accurately simulate how most predator 
and prey populations actually evolve because various factors such models ignore would need to be 
accounted for to produce such simulations.  Diseases, anthropogenic habitat modification, in situ 
predator selectivity (e.g., predators culling the most abundant of  multiple prey species), and 
topographical features (e.g., resource patchiness) are just some of  the exceedingly many contingent 
factors that can significantly impact how natural predator and prey populations interact and evolve 
(cf. Allen & Greenwood 1988; Chesson 1978; Grünbaum 2012). However, that a model does not 
predict events due to such contingencies does not show that it is uninformative or that it cannot aid 
in developing better models and inferences.    
2.3. Who’s afraid of ceteris paribus conditions? 
Sagoff  contends that gravity is not contravened by contingent local factors as a legitimate “general 
force” while predator/prey effects are; such that the ceteris paribus conditions for TEMs are supposed 
to be problematically restricted in comparison to those of  physics models.  However, really nothing is 
contravened anywhere.  Gravity does not contravene local causal factors and dominant local causal 
factors do not contravene gravity—neither magnetism nor jumping contravene gravity and gravity 
does not contravene magnetism or jumping.  Likewise, even when local factors influence population 
                                                            
12 In a recent article he even argues as much; Sagoff 2016, p. 3007. 
abundance dynamics in ways a basic LV-model cannot predict, predator/prey interactions and 
dynamics are still at play.  Hence, pointing out that LV-models simulate predator/prey dynamics that 
occur only in naturalistically improbable ceteris paribus conditions does nothing to show that they are 
uninformative or otherwise problematic.13 
Sagoff ’s claim (iv) and related claims assume that models are informative only by permitting 
one to deduce from simulations what will occur in nature or permitting one to deduce which 
situation-specific contingencies need to be countenanced to explain discrepancies between a 
simulation and what actually occurs (see Sagoff  2013, p. 3005 and 2003, p. 532; cf. Cartwright 1989, 
p. 50; Lipton 2004, p. 67).  Yet, the fact that LV-models often fail to accurately predict actual 
dynamics due to factors outside their ceteris paribus conditions does not even show that they do not 
accurately predict the outcomes of  typical predator/prey interactions (what they are designed for).  
Nor does it provide reason to think that they cannot help identify local “aberrations” that explain 
case-specific dynamics.  These conclusions do not follow logically, but from superannuated positivist 
assumptions Sagoff  embraces. 
Furthermore, LV-models provide insights into causally relevant typicalities and reciprocal 
relationships even when they cannot predict population dynamics because of  impacts of  unique 
local factors or anomalies.  Imagine a tidal wave extincting wolf  and deer populations on an island.  
Though a basic LV-model of  the form presented above would not predict this abrupt decline in 
both populations, surely this does not show that the model is problematic.  Impacts of  such local 
factors may show that a model is not suited to characterizing a target system because it does not 
account for those local factors.  Yet, this is no flaw with the model.  Trying to predict the impact of  
                                                            
13 Contrary to Sagoff's suggestions, it is notable that the Universal Law of Gravitation is not actually universal.  It does 
not hold at microphysical scales or in parts of space remote from Earth (e.g. in black holes), and it can be masked by the 
presence of various “greater” local cause (e.g. magnetism).  These occurrences also cannot be deduced from models 
derived from the Universal Law; cf. Cartwright 1983; Lange 2002; Mitchell 2009, Ch. 3. 
tidal waves with an LV-model is obviously a misapplication; and an LV-model would still provide 
insights into the wolf  and deer population dynamics in the absence of  catastrophic tidal waves. 
That notwithstanding, many cases are not so extreme, and in situ predator/prey dynamics can 
be seen as resulting from species-typical behaviors as mitigated by unique local factors.   To more 
instructively respond to Sagoff ’s (iv) and further illuminate how theoretical methods square with 
Sagoff ’s (i) and (ii), I will now outline in simplified terms how LV-models can be used in iterative 
and ampliative processes to: inform inferences, reinforce conclusions drawn from empirical 
observations, and even help ‘find a signal in the noise’ in particular cases. 
2.4. Building Case-specific TEMs  
Sagoff’s positivist interpretation of theoretical ecology is undercut by the fact that TEMs can be, and 
are, used in iterative and ampliative processes of building case-specific models with value for 
reasoning about particular populations.14  To begin to understand how more complex and extensive 
case-specific TEMs can be generated, one must move beyond the idea that applying TEMs only 
means applying ready-made models or principles straight out of the box—or “a priori” as Sagoff 
says—to predict by deduction the dynamic trends that two interacting population should exhibit. I 
have already pushed on this idea by acknowledging that LV-equations are not models until they are 
imbued with species-typical values.  Let’s now move a bit further in thinking about potential 
applications of LV-models by noting that the application of simple, two-population, LV-models is a 
building block of more complex models and applications.  This building block essentially 
conceptually links two interacting populations (as is represented in Figure 1) via the variables and 
parameters expressed in equations 2 and 3 above. 
                                                            
14 Since my discussion of  practical applications here must be rather brief  for concerns of  space, I would like to note that 
there is plenty of  literature on successful applications of  TEMs and methods.  That literature includes discussions of  
applications for practical decision-making (e.g. Van Dyne (Ed.). 1969 and Grant & Swannack 2008), discussions of  
generally fruitful applications of  specific models (e.g. Zhang et al 2010), as well as discussions of  related philosophical 
issues (e.g. Odenbaugh 2005). 
 Figure 1: Conceptual diagram of typical reciprocal impacts represented as causally connecting target wolf and 
moose populations in a basic LV-model. 
Generating more extensive TEMs, including case-specific LV-models, and running more 
complex possible scenario simulations, is then a matter of  linking together more models.15  By doing 
this one can simulate the collective impacts an indefinitely large number of  populations and other 
factors may have on selected populations of  concern.  For example, if  a wolf  population were a 
selected population-of-concern, one could generate a more complex case-specific LV-model by 
conceptually building out from that population a model-community; a network of  LV-models that 
could help garner insights into how other local populations and factors might impact (or be 
impacted by) that population.  I hope Figure 2 assists my reader in envisioning how one can go 
about constructing a case-specific community model by linking together basic population-to-
population predator/prey models to conceptually build out from a population-of-concern in this way 
(cf. Donhauser 2014, pp. 101-2). 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual diagram of the reciprocal causal impacts that can be represented as causally connecting 
other case-relevant populations to target wolf and moose populations in a more complex LV-model. 
                                                            
15 Numerous sources explain different ways to do this; Bender et al 1984 is one. 
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Figure 2 suggests a model that would consider impacts of wolf and moose populations on each 
other and also considers more indirect, or mitigated, impacts through their interactions with other 
populations and factors.  In it, I include organic populations that are not conventionally conceived 
as predators or prey but that can be usefully modelled as such in LV-models to underscore the 
adaptability of LV-models.  Indeed, ecologists continue to extend thinking far beyond conventional 
conceptions of ‘predator’ and ‘prey’ in applications of LV-models.  Models of the LV form are used 
to characterize populations interacting through interspecies competition (mutually detrimental), 
predator/prey (beneficial/detrimental), mutualistic (mutually beneficial), amensalistic 
(detrimental/no-impact), and commensalistic (beneficial/no-impact) interactions—among others. 
Ecologists also use them to characterize reciprocal dynamics between plant populations in which 
one species (the ‘predator’) typically out competes the other (the ‘prey’) for light and nutrient 
resources (e.g., Mäkelä & Hari 1984).  LV-models are even used to characterize reciprocal dynamics 
between infectious diseases (the ‘predator’) and different biological populations (the ‘prey’) (e.g., 
Holt & Pickering 1985 and Rohr et al 2006). 
 In view of the array of possible population-to-population and population-to-environment 
interactions that can be envisaged as predator/prey interactions, one can imagine building all sorts of 
LV-models to inform considerations in particular cases using the very basic strategy that I have 
suggested here alone.  One can also see ways TEMs can be used to inform and augment empirical 
research.  To illustrate some of these, let’s consider some populations at Isle Royale Sagoff discusses 
in recent work. 
Sagoff  (2016) focuses on Isle Royale to motivate claims that uniqueness and contingency in 
natural ecological communities render TEMs useless, as numerous unpredictable events have 
resulted in similarly unpredictable local wolf  and moose population dynamics.  Researchers 
documented eighty percent decline in the wolf  population apparently due to an outbreak of  canine 
parvovirus and then a similar decline in the moose population apparently “due to the combined 
effects of  a severe winter, a tick outbreak, and a catastrophic food shortage” on the island in the 
1980s (2016, p. 3014).  In subsequent years, researchers observed a shift in climatic factors, severe 
summer and winter conditions, that apparently had a more drastic effect on population abundances 
than species-typical predator/prey interactions at Isle Royale.  Then, more recently, researchers 
documented a marked decline in the wolf  population between 2011 and 2013 that has been 
attributed to the alpha male and other wolves from the local pack drowning in a flooded mineshaft 
in 2011 (Sagoff, p. 3015). 
Notably, as with tidal waves, disease outbreaks, climate change impacts, and mineshaft 
accidents each fall outside the scope of  a basic LV-model.  Yet, again, a basic LV-model would still 
provide insights into the impacts of  predator/prey relationship on the salient wolf  and moose 
populations even in the wake of  these events.  This is because predator/prey interactions are still at 
play even when other factors, and even those with rather severe impacts, are also at play.  
Accordingly, it is reasonable to believe that generating models that incorporate various LV-sub-
models to do multiple possible scenario-analyses and to test hypotheses based on observations could 
help better understand the populations at Isle Royale and could thereby aid in devising more robust 
strategies for managing and protecting the island’s wolves and moose. 
 One straightforward way that case-specific LV-models can be informative is by enabling 
retrodictive validation of hypotheses based on empirical observations.  At Isle Royale, an LV-model 
that takes account of parvovirus efficiency could be compared against data-models of abundances to 
test the hypothesis that the disease outbreak was the leading cause of the eighty percent decline in 
the wolf population in the 1980’s (see Wilmers et al 2006).  Likewise, an LV-model that accounts for 
tick outbreak impacts could be used to enhance understanding of the cause of the subsequent 
decline observed in the Moose population.  An LV-model could also be constructed to help examine 
whether the 2011 death of the alpha male and other pack members could indeed have produced 
more recent declines in the Isle Royale wolves.  Additionally, LV-model simulations can be 
compared with abundance level data plots to help pin down time periods during which researchers 
should be look for significant factors other than predator/prey interactions, ‘a signal in the noise,’ to 
explain observed population changes.  Indeed, it is precisely because they draw together species-
typical relationships and provide a means of predicting general trends in predator/prey abundances 
ceteris paribus, LV-models have such applications for helping make inferences about contingent 
factors other than predator/prey interactions that impact those abundances. 
 What’s more, in direct contradiction of Sagoff’s claims that LV-models cannot inform 
considerations about natural populations, there are in fact LV-models of the Isle Royale wolf and 
moose populations that do so.  These include applications of LV-models of Isle-Royale-populations 
that have proven useful for understanding species-typical functional responses and wolf-pack-
isomorphic variations in functionality (Jost et al 2005). Then there are related LV-models that 
arguably do accurately predict (i.e. retrodict) Isle Royale population dynamic as seen in aggregate 
survey data (see Vucetich et al 2011).  There is even a user-friendly online version of an LV-model 
of those populations Scott Fortmann-Roe has developed using his Insight Maker app, which permits 
one to simulate dynamic cycles at Isle Royale and compare those LV-model simulations with trends 
seen in sixty-years-worth of data (Isle Royale). 
2.5. “Ecological network-level properties” versus Trends in Data 
Finally, let me address Sagoff ’s comments about the existence of  ecological entities and properties.  
Via (ii) and related claims, he explicitly denies that ecological-networks and network-level properties 
exist in his commentary.  He also denies the existence of  observable dynamics and patterns that I 
refer to in my paper.  Accordingly, he forefronts allegations that I “nonchalantly assume that 
ecological network-level properties exist” in his abstract (p. 0).  He elaborates on why he thinks I 
make such assumptions and why he thinks it is problematic later, saying: 
Donhauser in his paper uses the term ‘network-level’ 26 times; he speaks of ‘ecological 
network-level dynamics;’ ‘ecological network-level phenomena;’ and ‘network level 
structure.’ The critics to whom he responds, however, deny that network-level phenomena, 
such as oscillations, are observed. If network-level properties have been observed, there 
must be an empirical literature documenting their occurrence, but it is elusive. (p.6) 
 
This comment is misdirected, because criticisms centering on questions about the 
metaphysical status of  ecological entities and properties are not among the narrow range of  
criticisms I directly respond to (very briefly) in my paper—as explained above (in §1).  Worse though 
is that: Sagoff ’s allegation that I presuppose the existence of  ecological-network level properties in 
my paper is unwarranted; he mistakenly believes that I claim that ecological network-level properties 
are observable; and he wrongly thinks that I claim that “oscillations,” or oscillating behaviors, are 
properties of  ecological networks.16 
Although his count of  the times I use variations of  ‘network-level’ in my paper may be 
correct, Sagoff ’s allegation that I assume that ecological network-level properties exist in nature 
derives from overlooking explicit indicators that I do not make such assumptions.  In fact, I make no 
commitment regarding the existential status of  networks or network properties in my paper, but refer 
to claims and views ecologists and advisory organizations apparently hold.  Moreover, in many places I urge that 
they need not make such commitments.  My first mention of  debates about the existential status of  
ecological entities is even accompanied by a footnote (the first in the paper), which says: “I am 
sympathetic to the view that many concepts employed in ecology (e.g. ‘ecosystem’ and ‘community’) 
                                                            
16 Because he mistakenly believes that I assume that there are network-level properties that are irreducible to series of  
organism-to-organism and organism-to-environment interactions, Sagoff ’s also misreads my brief  comments about 
natural selection.  He responds as if  I claim that natural kinds of  ecological networks are naturally selected and are 
subject to evolution (his §3).  However, I actually say that organisms living or dying and successfully breeding or not are 
at once the mechanisms for species evolution and the mechanisms for changes in population abundances.  I respond to 
this point only briefly, in this footnote, because it draws in a gaggle of  worries about the nature of  natural selection that 
are very far afield from both the considerations of  my paper and from the rest of  Sagoff ’s comments about theoretical 
methods in ecology. 
[…] serve as useful and practically valuable theoretical constructs even if  they haven’t any naturally 
delineated referents” (p. 67). 
Furthermore, I think my deflationary account of  teleology in the paper can easily be read as 
presupposing an eliminative stance on the metaphysical status of  ecological networks and properties; 
such that network-level phenomena and properties are completely reducible to stochastic 
component-to-component interactions.  This would be a natural interpretation following my claims 
that pioneering theoretical ecologists explicitly jettisoned the “idea that ecological networks bear 
irreducible causal properties” (p. 69).  Accordingly, I would think one would easily read my claims 
about ‘ecological network properties’ as claims about “series of  causal interactions through which 
biota and abiota can […] produce dynamic patterns observable in aggregate data on relative 
population and nutrient abundances” (p. 70).  Further still, I explicitly endorse a neutral metaphysical 
stance in my paper, and claim that modern ecologists can and should embrace a neutral stance on 
the ontological status of  ecological entities and properties (pp. 69-70; 74).  Thus, I argue that 
conceptions and talk of  ecological populations, communities, and systems, and their properties are 
heuristically useful ways of  thinking and talking about contingent ecological assemblages and aggregate 
dynamics observable in data—without saying anything about what metaphysics (realist or antirealist) 
one ought to choose.17 
What about Sagoff ’s related claims that I assume that observable “oscillations” are exhibited 
by natural ecological networks?  To begin with, I talk about “oscillations” in repetition of  
Hutchinson’s use of  this term in his 1948 paper.  So, contrary to Sagoff ’s reading, I do not say 
anything about whether natural ecological networks oscillate; honestly, I am not sure I even know 
what that is supposed to mean.  Rather, I offer an interpretation of  what Hutchinson says about 
                                                            
17 Sagoff  presupposes that concerns about establishing the existence of  ecological entities and properties are inseparable 
from concerns about the instrumentality of  ecological theories and TEMs, while, as a general point, there are many 
instrumentally useful theories and models that posit things that have not been shown to exist. 
observable “oscillations” and explain how he appears to have used teleological metaphors in the 
development of  bottom-up accounts of  the types of  mechanisms that can produce observable 
oscillations (pp. 71-2).  Moreover, as I interpret Hutchinson in my paper, neither he nor I say 
anything about natural ecological networks exhibiting observable oscillating behaviors.  Rather, 
Hutchinson (1948), and so I, use that word to refer to correlations and repeating patterns observable in 
aggregated data on population and nutrient/resource abundances.  Specifically, I write that 
Hutchinson: “provides accounts of  the mechanics that could produce correlated dynamic patterns, 
what he calls ‘oscillations,’ observable in data on nutrient resource and species abundances and data 
on the Earth’s biosphere” (p. 70). 
Now Sagoff  also denies that there are any such correlations and patterns observable in 
aggregated data.  He even expresses this while criticizing my using toy data values to generate an 
illustrative faux data plot in my paper; claiming that one, “has to make up the values since there are 
no data sets—no sustained empirical evidence—that could serve the purpose” (p. 4).  Yet, the 
confidence with which he just plain denies that there are such observable correlations is astonishing. 
Surely, Sagoff  does not mean to claim that there are no hydrologic cycles, weather patterns, 
seasons, and associated nutrient cycles; that would be absurd.  It is also easy to find data correlations 
between nutrient and plant species abundances.  Hence, I take it that his claims on this point must 
be restricted to data on conventionally conceived predator and prey populations.  But even with this 
restriction, his comment does not wash. 
An obvious place to look for the sorts of  data sets I had in mind when discussing 
Hutchinson’s work is where I direct one to look in my paper.  There, in the footnote that 
accompanies my “made up” figure, I list five places one can find discussions and plots of  such data 
in independent works by Volterra and George Clarke. To ensure I hadn’t suffered a lapse of  sanity, 
upon reading Sagoff ’s comment I checked those citations and also looked back at another, more 
well-known, counterexample to his denial of  such data’s existence.  In my first edition of  E.P. 
Odum’s Fundamentals of  Ecology that classical data plot on a “pure”—relatively unobstructed by other 
factors—predator/prey community was still there.  This is the plot of  the Hudson Bay Company’s 
century-long Canadian lynx and snowshoe hare pelt-trading records, which Odum re-draws in his 
text and I re-draw here: 
 
Figure 3: Redrawn from (Odum 1953, p. 134); where he says this plot shows “[c]hanges in the abundance of 
the lynx and snow shoe hare, as indicated by the number of pelts received by the Hudson Bay Company.  This 
is a classic case of cyclic oscillation in population density (redrawn from MacLulich 1937).”18 
 
This data admittedly presents a rare case, and predator/prey changes often look much 
messier by comparison because of  local contingent factors that also impact abundance levels. Yet, 
even where other factors have a substantive impact on abundances, one can find correlated patterns 
in the comparatively messier data.  As a case in point, look at the data from Isle Royale (Figure 4) 
that Sagoff  (2016) argues says should show that there are no correlations or patterns observable in 
data on natural predatory/prey populations.  Even there correlations and patterns can be found. 
                                                            
18 Tyson, Haines, & Hodges 2010 provide a nice discussion of  how typical interactions with other species bear on typical 
lynx and hare dynamics and of  how to account for this in models. 
 
Figure 4: Adapted from Peterson & Vucetich (2016, p. 3).   This figure shows “[w]olf and moose fluctuations, 
Isle Royale National Park, 1959-2016”; where “[m]oose population estimates during 1959–2001 were based on 
population reconstruction from recoveries of dead moose” and that other estimates are based on aerial surveys 
and track identification. 
Because of  the above noted disease outbreaks, extreme weather conditions, and accidents at 
Isle Royale, the correlations and patterns here are not as neat as the case of  the lynx and hare above.  
Yet, there are still correlations and patterns to be found in this data.  Anyone can see: when one of  
the population abundances is high the other is low, and this occurs while each is fluctuating in 
repeating upward and downward cycles.  Where the patterns here are disrupted, researchers at Isle 
Royale have kept track of  the noted dominant contingent factors that account for that. 
Should we side with Sagoff  and agree that, because local contingencies disrupt otherwise 
typical moose and wolf  interactions and obscure neat patterns, such patterns are too insignificant to 
be counted?  Robert MacArthur—who I quoted in my (2016) paper to make a related point (p. 
73)—I think provides a way to square undeniable variability and the appearance of  the sorts of  
correlations observable in both Figures 3 and 4.  MacArthur (1968) writes: 
Ecological patterns, about which we construct theories, are only interesting if they are 
repeated. They may be repeated in space or time, and they may be repeated from species to 
species. A pattern which has all of these kinds of repetition is of special interest because of 
its generality, and yet these very general events are only seen by ecologists with rather blurred 
vision. The very sharp-sighted always find discrepancies and are able to say that there is no 
generality, only a spectrum of special cases.  (p. 159) 
 
This is to say that although unique local features are clearly present in nature there are typical 
causal processes and interactions that produce observable correlations and patterns nonetheless.  
Hence, in Jay Odenbaugh’s words, “some patterns are general though they will have exceptions. 
Nevertheless, they […can] be explained by models which depict those causal processes which 
generate those patterns” (2011, p. 125).  At once, MacArthur points out that if  one conceptually 
“zooms out” on a dataset he or she can see typical correlations and patterns, but if  one instead 
zooms in one finds nothing but deviations.  Sagoff  has chosen to zoom in and emphasize the 
deviations.  However, this does not make correlations and patterns due to species-typical behaviors 
and interactions any less real; what we choose to pay attention to does not change the fact that there 
are causally relevant typicalities that play roles in how predator and prey abundances change. 
As I’ve said (in §2.3), predator/prey interactions are still at play even when other factors, and 
even those with rather severe impacts, are also at play.  Accordingly, though the noted hardships no 
doubt made pack hunting and foraging and breeding more difficult and less frequent, surely the 
remaining wolves and moose at Isle Royale still behaved in ways typical of  their species.  It is not a 
“fact that the significant causal factors in any instance are so ephemeral, transitory, extemporaneous, 
spontaneous, one-off, coincidental, and contingent that they may never occur twice” as Sagoff  says 
(p. 14).  Some significant causal factors are typical as well.  Hence, I cannot see why ecologists 
should not carry on “theorizing [about] patterns and regularities” while also “building a catalogue of  
case studies” as they do.  That’s how ecology works. 
§3. Conclusion 
Sagoff ’s commentary on my (2016) paper is primarily a vehicle for rehashing concerns about 
theoretical ecology that are tangential to the concerns of  my paper.  Nevertheless, I have seriously 
engaged each of  the concerns he raises; because the need to understand ecology’s conceptual 
foundations and potential practical applications is not only interesting and significant but also 
increasingly-urgent, as policymakers and resource management practitioners confront compounding 
political, ethical, and management decisions. 
 Sagoff  and I clearly think very differently about how theoretical ecology works and how it 
can be usefully applied.  Where he sees an empirically baseless pseudo-science that is uninformative 
and useless, I have endeavored to illuminate the connections between theoretical and empirical work 
in ecology and make plain several ways TEMs can be applied to inform policy and resource-
management decision-making.  Moreover, I have distinguished and systematically defused the 
independent criticisms Sagoff  defends in his commentary—showing that they derive from a limited 
positivist understanding of  theoretical science and that his arguments for them are exposed as 
problematic once stripped of  that base. 
Despite our diverging perspectives on methods in ecology, I respect and admire Sagoff  for 
trying to make the tough sell and defending the unpopular critical position.  I am also grateful to 
him for taking the time to read and respond to my work.  It is my sincere hope that our exchange in 
these pages helps push forward dialogue about ecology’s philosophical foundations and scientific 
and practical value, and that it provides useful resources for others interested in ecology and its 
applications. 
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